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Between a rock and a hard place: COVID-19 and South Africa’s response 
Abstract 
The spread of COVID-19 across China, Asia, Europe and the United States of America was met with 
public health responses that initially encouraged hand washing and social distancing. They quickly 
turned to restrictions on the freedom of movement and assembly in the form of forced isolation, 
mandatory quarantines and lockdowns. Africa’s first confirmed case was not until 14 February in 
Egypt and March saw a steady spread of the virus throughout the African continent. Concern began 
to rise about the impact that the virus would have on a continent that is currently facing HIV and TB 
epidemics and sporadic outbreaks of Ebola and Lassa Fever. There were fears that the already 
weakened health systems in many African jurisdictions may be unable to cope with another 
pandemic and quick and decisive action to stop the spread of the virus was considered to be 
essential.   
On 15 March 2020, nine days after the first recorded case in South Africa, President Cyril Ramaphosa 
announced a State of Disaster. Over the following weeks, a series of regulations were promulgated 
that limited the freedom of movement and assembly, limited the sale of certain items, specifically 
prohibited the sale and transportation of alcohol and cigarettes and criminalised the spread of 
disinformation on COVID-19. Together they represent the greatest limits on the Bill of Rights in post-
apartheid South Africa. However, public health strategies such as social distancing and regular hand 
washing are a privilege many in South Africa cannot afford, especially for thosein crowded informal 
settlements and who use mass public transport systems. In this paper, we consider these regulations 
and argue that two major issues are a lack of a community informed response and an over-reliance 
on the criminal law to this major public health crisis.  
Introduction 
In December 2019, a cluster of pneumonia cases was reported in China, which eventually led to the 
identification of the first case of COVID-19. Since then, COVID-19 has spread across Asia to Europe, 
and through to the United States before the first case was reported in Egypt on 14 February. 1 Daily 
updates from the Africa Centre for Disease Control (Africa CDC) shows that the number of recorded 
cases has risen daily with (as of 18 June 2020) 52 African Union Member States reporting 267 519 
cases, 7197 deaths and 122 661 recoveries.2 Together with Egypt and Algeria, South Africa was 
considered to be at the highest risk of the virus being imported and spreading with a moderate to 
high capacity to respond to an outbreak.3  
South Africa’s National Institute of Communicable Diseases (NICD) reported its first confirmed case 
on the 5 of March 2020. Since then, the number of recorded cases has steadily increased, but not at 
                                                          
1
 ‘COVID-19 Cases Top 10 000 in Africa’ (WHO | Regional Office for Africa) 
<https://www.afro.who.int/news/covid-19-cases-top-10-000-africa> accessed 13 April 2020. 
2
 ‘COVID-19’ (Africa CDC) <https://africacdc.org/covid-19/> accessed 13 April 2020. WHO Africa numbers are 
different as the WHO only captures WHO countries. WHO Africa states that there have been 86,115 confirmed 
cases, 4,206 deaths and 88,776 recovered as of 16 June 2020. WHOAfrica (https://www.afro.who.int/). 
(https://who.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/0c9b3a8b68d0437a8cf28581e9c063a9). For 
more on the AU response see Marguerite Massinga Loembé and others, ‘COVID-19 in Africa: The Spread and 
Response’ *2020+ Nature Medicine 1. 
3
 Marius Gilbert and others, ‘Preparedness and Vulnerability of African Countries against Importations of 
COVID-19: A Modelling Study’ (2020) 395 The Lancet 871. 
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the exponential rate that was initially expected.4 To date (16 June 2020), 73,533 confirmed cases and 
1,568 deaths have been reported by the NICD. With the arrival of COVID-19, the initial advice to 
South Africans focused on regular handwashing and social distancing. However, the declaration of 
COVID-19 as a pandemic by the World Health Organisation (WHO) on 11 March 2020, the global 
daily rise in reported cases, but crucially, the first case of community transmission in South Africa 
recorded, prompted President Cyril Ramaphosa and his government to act. Although the number of 
cases at the time remained relatively low (61 confirmed cases; 0 deaths), a national State of Disaster 
was declared on 15 March 2020 and a series of measures limiting the rights of South Africans were 
announced.  
Decisive action was indeed necessary. South Africa  is a deeply unequal society.5 Only 16% of the 
South African population has access to medical aid,6 with most of its population relying on the public 
healthcare sector that is under-resourced and poorly administered. In its 2016-2017 Annual 
Inspection Report, the Office of Health Standards reported that out of 851 public sector health 
establishments, 62% of these were non-compliant with the norms and standards for healthcare 
quality. Areas of deficiencies identified included a lack of or poor leadership and management, 
knowledge, competencies and support from senior staff.7 In addition, the South African health care 
system carries a significant burden of tuberculosis (TB), HIV and HIV/TB co-infection, with millions of 
the population on immunosuppressant drugs as well as others who are HIV positive but not 
receiving treatment for HIV.8 There are concerns that those with these co-morbidities are more 
susceptible to SARS-CoV2 infections and have a higher risk of developing severe COVID-19 disease.9 
Data shows that the younger populations have also been affected more than in other parts of the 
world.10 COVID-19 has disrupted the provision of routine health care in other parts of the world and 
will likely similarly affect South Africa, including the delivery of South Africa’s routine chronic 
illnesses and its TB and HIV antiretroviral programmes. South Africa’s already overstretched public 
health care system is thus unlikely to be able to withstand an explosion of COVID-19 cases, 
particularly when considering that better managed health care systems in some high-income 
countries (HICs) are overwhelmed. Preventing and containing the spread of COVID-19 in South Africa 
was thus a critical priority. 
                                                          
4
 For up to date figures, see https://www.nicd.ac.za/ (accessed 16 June 2020). 
5
 For more on this see Statistics South Africa, ‘Inequality Trends in South Africa: A Multidimensional Diagnostic 
of Inequality | Statistics South Africa’ <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12744> accessed 13 April 2020. 
6
 Council for Medical Schemes Annual Report 2015/2016  
7
 Office of Health Standards Compliance Annual Inspection Report 2016-2017 (Pretoria, 2018) 
8
 The estimated overall HIV prevalence rate is approximately 13,1% among the South African population. The 
total number of people living with HIV is estimated at approximately 7,52 million in 2018. ‘Statistical Release’ 
26; ‘The Numbers: HIV and TB in South Africa • It is estimated that there are around 3-million people living 
with HIV in South Africa who are not receiving treatment. Spotlight’ (Spotlight, 4 July 2018) 
<https://www.spotlightnsp.co.za/2018/07/04/the-numbers-hiv-and-tb-in-south-africa/> accessed 8 April 
2020. They constitute around 38% of those living with HIV. See 
https://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/southafrica. According to the 2018 WHO Global TB 
Report roughly 78 000 people died of TB in South Africa in 2017 – of these 56 000 were HIV positive and 
22 000 were not. 
9
 Academy of Science in South Africa, ASSAf Statement on the Implications of the Novel Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-
2; COVID-19) in South Africa 
https://www.assaf.org.za/files/2020/ASSAf%20Statement%20Corona%20Virus%202%20March%202020%20w
eb.pdf 
10
 ‘Why Sub-Saharan Africa Needs a Unique Response to COVID-19’ (World Economic Forum) 
<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/03/why-sub-saharan-africa-needs-a-unique-response-to-covid-19/> 
accessed 4 April 2020. 
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In drafting the government’s response to the virus, President Ramaphosa and his Cabinet had the 
opportunity to learn from the experiences of  China and Europe that focused on social distancing, 
self-isolation, quarantine, testing and lockdown. While such strategies have been proven effective in 
limiting and at times containing the spread of the virus, the socio-economic realities in South Africa 
limit their effectiveness. Public health strategies such as regular hand washing and social distancing 
that have proven to be effective in limiting the spread of the virus elsewhere are cheap preventive 
measures, but they are a privilege that many cannot afford in South Africa. Approximately 13% of all 
households are located in informal settlements that are poorly structured, cramped and at times 
lack access to running water.11 Self-isolation and quarantine are practically impossible in situations 
where  several people share a bedroom or indeed for the estimated 200,000 people who are 
currently homesless in South Africa. A significant portion of the population relies on cramped and 
over crowded public transport, with 69% using public taxis, 20.2% using buses and 9.9% using the 
trains.12 All of these factors highlight the impracticality of maintaining social distancing and 
challenges in ensuring good hygienic hand washing practices in these types of settings.13  
Despite these socio-economic realities, South Africa’s COVID-19 response needed to focus on 
containing and slowing down the spread of the virus. It is unsurprising that the regulations 
promulgated under the State of Disaster mainly focused on severely limiting the freedom of 
movement and assembly of its citizens. It was clear from the outset that this would have a 
considerable economic impact, and on 31 March, South Africa was downgraded to junk status with 
the South African Rand falling to a record low.14 President Ramaphosa was left with a choice of 
sacrificing the economy to slow the spread of the virus or putting the economy first and risk 
exposing an already weakened healthcare system and population suffering from other co-
morbidities to the virus. Faced with this choice, his decision to lockdown the country cannot be 
criticised and may prove decisive in containing and slowing down the spread of the virus.Considering 
the time it took to reach its borders, South Africa had time to prepare a COVID19 response and draw 
on the importance of its community informed response to other epidemics. However, despite the 
impact that these regulations were going to have on civil society, the lack of public deliberation and 
community engagement in developing these regulations are concerning. Furthermore, the 
criminalisation of non-compliance with these public health measures seeks to undermine their aims, 
has the potential to increase stigma and discrimination of the disease, and fails to address the real 
issue: ensuring that the population has the means to comply with the regulations. Combined, these 
factors question whether South Africa has learned from its response to its HIV epidemic. In outlining 
the first month of South Africa’s COVID-19 response, this paper will critique the lack of engagement, 
the criminalisation of non-compliance and discuss their potential impact. 
National State of Disaster 
                                                          
11
 Informal settlements and human rights in South Africa. (2018) Submission to the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living Socio-
Economic Rights Institute of South Africa. See 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Housing/InformalSettlements/SERI.pdf 
12
 Stats SA National Household Travel Survery 2013 (Pretoria, Jult 2014). 
13
 There have been attempts to improve the situation in certain areas. See ‘Covid-19 Lockdown: 28 Water 
Trucks Deployed to Informal Settlements in Cape Town’ <https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/news/covid-19-
lockdown-28-water-trucks-deployed-to-informal-settlements-in-cape-town-46109602> accessed 13 April 
2020. 
14
 ‘The Price SA Will Pay for Being Downgraded to Junk’ (BusinessLIVE) 
<https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/economy/2020-03-31-the-price-sa-will-pay-for-being-downgraded-to-
junk/> accessed 10 April 2020. 
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On 15 March 2020, President Ramaphosa addressed the nation and announced a National State of 
Disaster. A State of Disaster is distinct from a State of Emergency. The power to declare a State of 
Emergency derives from section 37 of the Constitution and it must be declared within the terms of 
the State of Emergency Act 1997. It can only be declared when ‘the life of the nation is threatened 
by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency’ and ‘the 
declaration is necessary to restore peace and order’. Upon declaration of a State of Emergency, 
certain rights under the Bill of Rights may be derogated from, with the exception of those non-
derogable rights expressly contained within section 37(5), that includes the rights to dignity, life and 
the right to a fair trial. A State of Emergency can only last for 21 days, unless Parliament decides to 
extend this declaration by 3 months at a time. The first extension must be done by a majority of 
Parliament and any subsequent extension requires the support of 60% of Parliament. Any court 
within South Africa has the power to decide on the validity of the State of Emergency, an extension 
of the State of Emergency or any regulations promulgated as part of the State of Emergency. 
Parliament and the courts thus clearly have a supervisory role under the State of Emergency. A 
partial State of Emergency was declared by President PW Botha in 1985 that extended to the entire 
country in 1986, permitting the then President to rule by decree, detain citizens without trial, 
restrict the freedom of movement and give the police and military considerable powers, which 
continued until 1990. A State of Emergency has not been declared since the establishment of a 
democratic South Africa in 1994.  
The Constitution does not make provision for the executive power to declare a State of Disaster. This 
is made possible through the Disaster Management Act 2002. This Act gives the relevant Minister 
the power to limit certain rights and freedoms within South Africa through the promulgating of 
regulations. A State of Disaster lasts for 3 months (unless it is terminated) and can be extended by 
the Minister one month at a time. Although rights may be limited, they cannot be derogated from, 
and any regulations promulgated must conform to the Bill of Rights. The courts can declare a State 
of Disaster invalid (and indeed the current State of Disaster was challenged and dismissed by the 
Constitutional Court15), or any regulations promulgated under the State of Disaster (on 2 June the 
regulations were struck down as unconstitutional16). Unlike the State of Emergency, there is no clear 
oversight role for Parliament in a State of Disaster. Parliament is not precluded from meeting during 
this time, but limitations on the freedom of assembly may affect the ability of Parliament to 
convene.  
To meet the criteria under the 2002 Act for a “disaster”, there must be the presence of a disaster 
that is defined as a ‘progressive or sudden, widespread or localised, natural or human-caused 
occurrence which causes or threatens to cause death, injury or disease; damage to property, 
infrastructure or the environment; or disruption of the life of a community.’ COVID-19 clearly falls 
within the definition of a disaster under the 2002 Act and on 15 March 2020, President Ramaphosa 
                                                          
15
 ‘ConCourt Kicks out NGO’s Legal Challenge against 21-Day Coronavirus Lockdown’ 
<https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/concourt-kicks-out-ngos-legal-challenge-against-21-day-coronavirus-
lockdown-45768339> accessed 8 April 2020. 
16
 In the matter between Reyno Dawid de Beer, Liberty Fighters Network, Hola Bon Renaissance Foundation 
and the Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (case no. 21542/2020) of 2 June 2020. 
https://www.judiciary.org.za/images/Rule_A16/In_the_matter_ between_Reyno_Dawid_De_Beer_-
_Libert_Fighters_Network_and_Minister_ 
of_Cooperative_Governance_and_Traditional_Affairs_Case_No_21542-2020. pdf (accessed 16 June 2020). For 
more on this case see M Labuschaigne, ‘Ethicolegal Issues Relating to the South African Government’s 
Response to COVID-19’ (2020) 13 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 
<http://www.sajbl.org.za/index.php/sajbl/article/view/630> accessed 16 June 2020. 
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granted Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional 
Affairs, the power to limit certain rights and freedoms within South Africa. A series of restrictions 
were announced on the same day, with further restrictions announced on 23 March 2020.17 
Amongst others, the regulations criminalised the spread of disinformation, prohibited the sale and 
transportation of cigarettes and alcohol from midnight on 26 March for 3 weeks (that was further 
extended by two weeks on 9 April 202018) and controlled the prices of certain essential products. For 
the purposes of this article, we will focus on the restrictions to the freedom of movement and 
assembly. 
Restrictions on the freedom of movement and assembly 
Strategies for containing the spread of COVID-19 that have been implemented elsewhere centre on 
social distancing, isolating, limiting the movement of citizens, testing and quarantining of those who 
have tested positive. Such measures are at the heart of South Africa’s response. Initially gatherings 
were restricted to 100 individuals and establishments that served alcohol could have no more than 
50 individuals. As of midnight on 26 March, all gatherings, including gatherings for prayer were 
prohibited for 3 weeks, with the exception of funerals that were limited to 50 individuals. As of 
midnight on 26 March, all but essential movement was prohibited for 3 weeks (and extended until 
31 April), in what is known locally as a lockdown. The leaving of a home was only permitted to buy 
essential goods, seek medical attention, buy medical products, collect social grants, attend a funeral 
of no more than 50 people, access public transport for essential services, or attend work that is 
deemed to be an essential service during specified times. The leaving of a house for exercise or to 
walk a dog was prohibited and the movement between provinces and districts was not permitted. 
These restrictions were extended by a further two weeks on 9 April and the total ‘hard’ lockdown 
period lasted until 30 April.   
The regulations introduced also state that anyone who is suspected of having COVID-19 or has been 
in contact with a person who has tested positive for COVID-19 cannot refuse testing. If confirmed 
positive, they cannot refuse treatment, isolation or quarantine. Similar provisions already exist in the 
Regulations Relating to the Surveillance and Control of Notifiable Medical Conditions gazetted in 
June 2017 under the National Health Act. Under this regulation, if a person refuses to consent to the 
testing, treatment, isolation or quarantine of a notifiable medical condition, the Head of a provincial 
department can apply to the High Court to require the mandatory testing, treatment, isolation or 
quarantining of that individual. Failure to comply may result in imprisonment not exceeding 12 
years, a fine, or both. The COVID-19 regulations, however, go further, and while an application to 
the magistrate’s court for the mandatory testing, treatment, isolation or quarantine is made, that 
person can be placed in isolation or quarantine for 48 hours. Furthermore, the power to make this 
application is vested in the hands of an ‘enforcement officer’, defined as including a member of the 
South African Police Service (SAPS), the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), a peace 
officer and not the Head of a provincial department.  
Through the restrictions on movement and assembly, it was anticipated or expected that the 
transmission of the virus would be hindered. However, these restrictions extend beyond the 
restrictions on freedom of movement and assembly imposed under the apartheid government. 
                                                          
17
 For a list of all regulations, guidelines and speeches see ‘Regulations and Guidelines - Coronavirus Covid-19 | 
South African Government’ <https://www.gov.za/coronavirus/guidelines> accessed 13 April 2020. 
18
 ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa: Extension of Coronavirus COVID-19 Lockdown to the End of April | South 
African Government’ <https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-extension-coronavirus-covid-
19-lockdown-end-april-9-apr-2020-0000> accessed 13 April 2020. 
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Although these restrictions were introduced in response to a public health emerengency and is a 
completely different context to apartheid, the restrictions on the freedom of movement in the 
lockdown period have been met with some apprehension. The CEO of the South African Human 
Rights, Tseliso Thipanyane, describes the measures introduced as similar to those associated with a 
State of Emergency and argues that President Ramaphosa was reluctant to use that term due to its 
association with apartheid.19 Considering the almost total limitation on the right of assembly (with 
the exception of a funeral) and the severe limitations on the freedom of movement, the effect of 
these measures is indeed more akin to a State of Emergency in the context of these rights. 
Furthermore, in the first week of April, South Africans learned of the government’s plan to decrease 
the population in 29 critically overcrowded information settlements across the country by relocating 
thousands of residents from their homes in an attempt to slow the spread of the coronavirus.20 
Residents that opposed this relocation find it reminiscent of apartheid’s forced removal in 1968 of 
over 60,000 residents of Cape Town’s District Six area (after the apartheid government’s declaration 
of District Six as a whites-only area). Conditions at temporary camps for the duration of COVID-19 
lockdown for 2,000 homeless people to slow down the spread of the virus are a cause for concern. 
Many of these homeless people have said they have been forced to move to the temporary camps.21   
The restrictions on freedom of movement are within the powers granted under the 2002 Act and in 
line with the World Health Organisation (WHO) recommendations on curbing the spread of the 
virus. The declaration of a State of a Disaster and the subsequent regulations can be reviewed and 
declared invalid by a court and the measures should conform to the Rule of Law. However, it is the 
reliance on the criminal law for non-compliance with the restrictions that we consider to be 
unnecessary and contrary to good public health policy, but also fails to consider the socio-economic 
realities for non-compliance. 
Criminalisation of public health measures: potential impacts 
South Africa, and indeed Africa, is no stranger to epidemics. On 8 August 2014 the WHO declared a 
Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) in response to the West Africa Ebola 
epidemic that went on for over two years. South Africa currently has a generalised HIV epidemic, is 
battling a TB epidemic, and considerable investment has gone into its prevention, testing and 
treatment campaigns. While every epidemic is different, the importance of community engagement 
is clear in developing any response to an epidemic, and interventions that succeed are likely to be 
informed by the community. During the Ebola epidemic, WHO guidance initially prohibited 
traditional burial practices for containment purposes, but these guidelines had to be changed and 
were modified in conjunction with the affected communities.22 South Africa similarly learned that 
                                                          
19
 ‘Human Rights Suspended in Face of Covid-19 Disaster’ (SowetanLIVE) 
<https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2020-03-23-human-rights-suspended-in-face-of-covid-19-
disaster/> accessed 8 April 2020. 
20
 ‘Covid-19: Household Screenings Begin as Experts Warn about False Picture of Crisis’ (TimesLIVE) 
<https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2020-04-05-household-covid-19-screenings-begin-as-
experts-warn-about-false-picture-of-crisis/> accessed 8 April 2020. 
21
 ‘Suspect Held for Teen’s Rape at Strandfontein Camp for Homeless’ <https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-
africa/western-cape/suspect-held-for-teens-rape-at-strandfontein-camp-for-homeless-46588855> accessed 13 
April 2020. 
22
 Akin Abayomi and others, ‘African Civil Society Initiatives to Drive a Biobanking, Biosecurity and 
Infrastructure Development Agenda in the Wake of the West African Ebola Outbreak’ (2016) 24 Pan African 
Medical Journal <http://www.panafrican-med-journal.com/content/article/24/270/full/> accessed 13 
February 2020; Suerie Moon and others, ‘Will Ebola Change the Game? Ten Essential Reforms before the next 
Pandemic. The Report of the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola’ (2015) 386 
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prevention, testing and treatment campaigns must involve the community and community-based 
services are essential in achieving results.23 Public engagement is thus essential at both a macro level 
in the formation of policy and at a micro level whereby community engagement can help support 
the implementation of policy. 
At a macro level, any guidance must be contexualised to take account of local healthcare systems, 
beliefs and traditions. For the COVID-19 measures to succeed, it is necessary to know what different 
communities need to meet these measures, and an important component is community 
engagement. South Africa should draw on its considerable experience in conducting community 
engagement to ensure that the regulations address COVID-19 and do not result in stigma, 
discrimination, or disproportionately affect the poor and perpetuate health inequity. A community-
centred response for COVID-19 is thus essential.24 While President Ramaphosa clearly stated in his 
March 2020 address to the nation that he consulted with business and industry, there appears to be 
a lack of consultation with those living in cramped informal settlements who will struggle to comply 
with these restrictive measures. The lockdown deprives those working in the informal sector from 
employment and access to a wage. Generally living hand to mouth, they are unlikely to have savings. 
Indeed, in the De Beer decision that held some of the lockdown regulations to be unconstitutional, 
the Court referred to the millions of informal workers who have lost their livelihood, forced to watch 
their children go hungry and stripped of their ‘rights of dignity, equality, to earn a living and to 
provide for the best interests of her children’.25  
Approximately 17 million South Africans rely on social grants as their only income, constituting one 
in five persons. Social grants take different forms and include a child support grant; disability grant; 
older person grant, foster care grant, relief of distress and a care-dependency grant, amongst others 
afforded in terms of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004.26 However, with many more South Africans 
now left unemployed, there will be more within the family relying on these grants.27 While a number 
of relief measures aimed at mitigating the  impact of the measures were announced, including an 
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accessed 8 April 2020. 
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increase in some of the social grants, it is estimated that 45% of South African workers are not 
eligible to access some of the funds that were made available.28 
The South African government’s response is characterised by an over-reliance on, and faith in the 
power of the criminal law. This militarised response was very evident, with President Ramaphosa 
appearing in military fatigues on the night the lockdown started. Failure to comply with some of the 
lockdown restrictions may result in imprisonment of up to 6 months, a fine, or both. The South 
African National Defense Force (SANDF) has also been bestowed with additional powers. Under the 
2002 Act, financial, human and other resources may be released and directed towards the resolution 
of the disaster. During the 23 March address, President Ramaphosa announced that he had directed 
the SANDF to be deployed to support the SAPS. The presence of the military in enforcing the 
lockdown soon became a familiar scene in many streets across South Africa and they quickly moved 
to enforce the regulations. An entire group of almost 50 wedding guests, including the bride and 
groom, were arrested in the first week of April for breaking the ban on public gatherings,29 and two 
doctors who tested positive for COVID-19, were forced into quarantine at a medical facility.30 
However, on 2 June, the North Gauteng High Court issued an order prohibiting government from 
forcing those who test positive for COVID-19 into state quarantine facilities if they are able to self-
isolate. The High Court held that a person is ‘only required to be quarantined or isolated at a state 
facility, or other designated quarantine site, when that person is unable to self-isolate, or refuses to 
do so, or violates the self-quarantine or self-isolation rules’. 31 Within the first few days of the 
lockdown there were reports of the SANDF and SAPS using rubber bullets32 and allegations of 
abuse.33 Eight people were reported to have been killed by the police during the first week of the 
lockdown in enforcing the COVID-19 regulations, which at that time was more than the number of 
deaths related to the virus.34   
It is not just the heavy handiness of the enforcement and the power given to SAPS and SANDF that 
we take issue with, but the regulations that have criminalised knowingly exposing and transmitting 
COVID19 to others. The criminalisation of the transmission of HIV, for example, is considered to be 
bad policy that is lacking in any evidence-base and only serves to stigmatise the disease and 
discriminate against those who have it,35 leading to potential human rights abuses.36 In the context 
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of pandemics, there is the concern that criminalisation could have severe health-related effects on 
the population, undermine and exacerbate public health challenges caused by the pandemic37 and 
have a devastating impact on already marginalised, stigmatised or criminalised communities.38 South 
Africa fortunately resisted any attempts to criminalise HIV, but it is unclear why there has been a 
different response to COVID-19. Rather than encourage screening, testing and treatment, is likely to 
drive those who have or suspect they have COVID-19 underground.  
Stigma reduction campaigns are essential in a COVID-19 response.39 Key to this is stopping the 
spread of disinformation. Here South Africa has considerable experience from its HIV epidemic, as 
there is a history of false cures for HIV that include garlic, beetroot and holy water, to name but a 
few.40 However, once again the emphasis is on the criminal law, as the spreading of disinformation 
(or fake news) on COVID-19 through any media, that includes social media, has been criminalised. 
While stopping the spread of disinformation is necessary, informing the public about the disease is 
essential. The South African government has opted to centralise the dissemination of information, 
requiring that all requests for information be directed to the NICD. Other experts in South Africa 
have been instructed not to talk to the press.41 As a result of this, the NICD is overwhelmed and 
unable to respond to many of the requests.  
Furthermore, criticism of the national response has been met with public attacks rather than 
engagement with the concerns raised. When a phased relaxation of lockdown regulations were 
announced and various sets of contradicting and confusing rules were outlined by the respective 
portfolio ministers, various experts raised their concerns and expressed their opinions. Prof Glenda 
Gray, the president of the South African Medical Research Council as well as COVID19 ministerial 
advisory committee member particularly came under fire when she criticised the government’s 
phased relaxation of lockdown approach as ‘nonsensical and unscientific’ to the media. This in turn 
led to the South African Health Minister, Dr. Zweli Mkhize to release a statement in response to Prof 
Gray’s public attack of government as well as a request of investigation of Gray’s conduct by the 
MRC. The investigation was later on dropped and Prof Gray was cleared of any transgressions 
following the response and right of academic freedom outcry from the scientific community.42 
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Banning other suitably qualified experts from speaking with the press will only further limit the 
dissemination of reliable information, which is important in stopping the spreading of disinformation 
and combatting any stigma. These experts can provide much needed up-to-date information on 
testing and treatment. There have been reports that employers are threatening to dismiss 
employees who cannot provide evidence that they do not have the virus.43 The South African Health 
Minister, has rightly warned that such measures will likely lead to discrimination, but with none of 
the employees meeting the (then) testing criteria and it exposes a lack of knowledge on this key 
issue. Testing is free in the public sector, but in the month since the first case was announced, the 
public National Health Laboratory Service (NHLS) only conducted 6,000 tests in total despite 
projections that they will conduct 5,000 test per day. The roll out of mobile testing units on 1 April 
2020 for mass community based testing began to address this,44 but the reality is that eighty per 
cent of all tests have been conducted in private labs that charge between R900 ($47) and R1400 
($73) per test.45 As of 16 June, a total number of 1 148 933 tests were conducted in both the public 
and private sector, out of a population of 59,83 million.46 
Conclusion 
In some ways, South Africa was fortunate as it took almost 3 months for COVID-19 to arrive. 
President Ramaphosa and his Ministers had time to learn from the experiences of the differing 
responses in Asia, Europe and the US. The COVID-19 epidemic in South Africa was always going to 
play out against the backdrop of other epidemics necessitating quick and decisive action. However, 
there has been an over-reliance on the criminal law in ensuring compliance and insufficient 
consideration of the socio-economic realities that sees a large segment of the South African 
population living in over-crowded informal settlements and who now have either no or limited 
access to employment or social support.  
As South Africa entered its third week of lockdown, President Ramaphosa was left with a choice of 
lifting a lockdown that would likely result in the spread of a virus, or extending the lockdown and 
measures that will disproportionately affect vulnerable populations, likely perpetuate inequality and 
lead to a rise in intergenerational poverty. Ramaphosa’s choices left him between a rock and hard 
place with no good option to choose. His only hope is that he would make the least worst option. 
Time will tell whether a lockdown extension will be worth the inevitably devastating economic 
impact. This virus may not discriminate those that it infects, but the effects of the virus will be most 
felt on already marginalised and vulnerable populations in South Africa for some time to come. 
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